Guest post by Patrick Potyondy,
Ph.D. Candidate in the Department of History at The Ohio State University
In 1949, Millicent McIntosh—soon to be president of Bernard
College—argued that “a well-adjusted individual who has majored in Greek
archaeology, in my opinion, is much better prepared for marriage and motherhood
than the ill-adjusted girl who has spent her time in special courses and doing
special reading.” Almost in response, Margaret Mead was quoted in 1960 as
saying, “The paradox of women who are educated like men and can do most of the
things men do, but are still taught to prefer marriage to any other way of
life, causes most of the confusion that exists for women today.” And then, in
1963, Betty Friedan published what would become her nationally famous The Feminine Mystique, representing the
cultural malaise of white women across the United States. While it remains an
important touchstone in the teaching of US history, Friedan’s work—like so many
others—was a culmination of thought and action which preceded hers.
Historian
Paula Fass, in Outside In argues that
the very paradoxes found in the quotes above led to the women’s revolution
epitomized by Friedan’s work. By the 1920s, women made up almost half of all
college students. With so many women in higher education, why then, by the
1940s, 1950s and 1960s, had more not become doctors, lawyers, CEOs? Fass calls
this the “female paradox”—that they “were receiving more education than they
seemed to need.” It would have driven economists nuts (it probably did).
The peace
of World War II, like the peace of previous wars, brought ironic changes in the
status of people. By 1950, women made up only 30 percent of higher education’s
student rolls (the lowest point in the entire twentieth century). Amidst
shifting social roles, many female students clamored for not only a better
education but a better future to match. A few women, like McIntosh above, were
conflicted about just exactly what they wanted—classical archaeology but not a
future in it? One woman admitted, “I’d trade History of Civilization for a
practical cooking and nutrition course.”
Some educators
had different plans, planning to provide these women with an education they
thought more suited to the life-goals of 1950s American white women—that is, a
picket-fence, kids, and a husband. Claiming the mantle of Progressivism in
education, this cadre of reformers believed that “young people gladly study
about things which have meaning for them.” So, Vassar—that school now thought
of as the bastion of feminism—had begun to offer courses in “euthenics” in the
1920s. Euthenics, or race development, emphasized women’s roles in
reproduction, child rearing, and family affairs. By the 1950s, such themes
permeated most colleges that offered courses directed at women. Vassar’s catalogue read: “certain courses are organized
around the needs of the individual student. They help her to uncover what she
is, and to say it honestly, and effectively, in whatever way she is best able
to.” It seemed to these educators that they were on the right track. After the
war, the baby boom was in full swing, and women were having babies earlier and
more often than at any point in the twentieth century (for that’s how the
period thought of it—women had
babies, not couples). Of course then, they might have thought, women need and
want this brand of instruction.
A majority
of educators, however, still thought the liberal arts should play a central
role. This group was supported by the millions of women who continued working,
even while married, after WWII. While some women were displaced as men returned
home, women’s participation in paid employment rose continuously after 1945—and
half of them were married. You can see how this might create conflict with the
educators above—would “practical cooking and nutrition” knowledge serve these
women well in the modern office? Following a more liberal course of
study—mixing psychology and sociology along with courses in “Family Life
Studies”—many women were moving toward a more expansive sense of economic and
social citizenship. Some of them would make families, some of them would make
careers, and many of them would do both.
Fass shows
that, by 1963 in any case, neither side of the educational spectrum won out
entirely. Colleges offered a diverse array of courses for a diverse array of
reasons. The significance, though, was that these debates over what sort of
education women should get while in higher education “helped to create the
basis for a massive renewal of feminist aspirations.”
And here,
we see the cultural and historical significance of Friedan’s Feminine Mystique. Far from a book out
of blue, it was a text of and for its time (after all, she surveyed college
women for the basis of her study). Her book was something for like-minded white
women to rally around and declare that it was high time to address “the problem
that has no name.”


